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CHANGING LEGAL CONTEXTS FOR
AFFIRMATIVE WELFARE REFORM
PROPOSALS
Melville D. Miller, Jr.*

I. Introduction
In the current welfare debate taking place at both the federal
and state levels, reform proponents frequently claim to be seeking
greater "flexibility" for meaningful, deep policy change. Proponents often make the case for such enhanced flexibility by urging
that responsibility for welfare be turned back to the states, to design and experiment with novel programs.' To test whether the
block grant approach currently under consideration in Congress
actually achieves the goal of providing states with the flexibility
necessary to effect meaningful policy changes, this Essay contrasts
the way two different reform proposals would be treated in the current legal and regulatory environment to the way they would likely
fare under the proposed legislation. One proposal used in this
analysis is a comprehensive welfare reform program, self-described
as "progressive," that was developed by a community-based, grass
roots coalition in New Jersey. The New Jersey reform proposal
aims to improve outcomes for recipients, rather than simply to cut
costs. The other proposal is a hypothetical cost-saving program
that simply limits welfare receipt -to one year.
Part II of this Essay describes the New Jersey reform proposal.
Part III contrasts the proposal's potential for adoption within the
existing federal legal framework2 with the potential adoption of a
one-year time limit proposal. Part IV considers the probable legal
status of the two proposals under the restricted block grant legislation now under consideration in Congress. This Essay concludes
that the proposed federal changes will complicate any implemen* President, Legal Services of New Jersey. I gratefully acknowledge the invaluable research efforts of my assistant Kristin Mateo.

1. Barbara Vobejda, GOP Outlines Broad Welfare Reform,

WASH.

POST, Jan. 7,

1995, at Al; House Committee on Ways and Means, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., On Welfare Reform: Growth of Means-Tested Programs and Spending, Welfare Entitlements,
and Block Grants (1995) (statement of Robert Greenstein, Exec. Director, Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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tation of expansive, recipient-oriented state-level reforms. Restrictive changes, by contrast, will be easier to accomplish.
II. The New Jersey Community-Based Welfare Reform
Proposal
Solutions to End Poverty Soon (STEPS) is a partnership of lowincome individuals, advocates who seek to assist such individuals,
agencies that serve such individuals and other interested parties.3
The coalition emerged in 1992 during a successful effort to rescind
previously adopted limitations on the state's General Assistance
program that would have limited benefits to six months in any
twelve-month period.4 In early 1993, recognizing the need for a
comprehensive reconsideration of state government policies toward poverty, including but extending well beyond the public
assistance program, the coalition began work on a broad reform
proposal.5 Though conceived as an evolving document, in May
1994 STEPS presented a draft of the proposal to Governor Christine Todd Whitman and began discussions with state officials about
possible new initiatives and fundamental changes in state policy.
The proposal focuses largely on the state's public assistance system. Historically, that cluster of benefits constitutes the largest
block of government expenditures on behalf of low-income people.
The STEPS proposal is of particular interest for two reasons: (i) it
was generated by a group consisting in significant part of people
with low incomes who are directly affected by poverty policy and
(ii) its substance appears to define the outer limit of what is potentially achievable in terms of recipient-oriented reforms in today's
political climate. For these reasons, the fundamentals of the program are presented in some detail.
A.

Observations of Current Policy

The proposal's critique of federal and state government policy
concerning poverty makes three major points. First, current gov3. The STEPS by-laws provide for governance by a statewide Coordinating Committee, 50% of which consists of low-income individuals. In addition, at least one of

the co-chairs of STEPS and at least one member of each of its principal committees
must be a low-income individual.
4. The limitations were contained in an addition to the annual state appropriations bill passed as Senate Bill 1361. S. 1361, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).

5. Except as noted, all discussion of the STEPS proposal is based upon the May,
1994 document, Economic Stability for Families and Individuals: A Proposalfor Pro-

gressive PublicAssistance Reform in New Jersey (on file with the Fordham Urban Law
Journal) [hereinafter STEPS].
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ernment policies and programs usually do not expressly seek to
combat poverty, but rather to address one or more "needs" of
those in poverty, such as minimal cash assistance, housing, child
care and nutrition. Data collected over the past forty years, however, suggests that poverty rises and falls with economic trends, not
with changes in government programs. With the exception of the
introduction of the cost-of-living index for Social Security, no government program of the last twenty-five years has had a demonstrable effect in reducing overall poverty.6
Second, current policies and programs are badly fragmented because they tend to focus on individual needs in isolation. Different
programs are implemented by different agencies at different levels
of government. These agencies rarely coordinate or design programs with the recognition that poverty usually results from a complex combination of problems.7 Thus, programs are often
inconsistent and work at cross-purposes. Such fragmentation is
doomed to fail; a policy cannot work when it addresses only one
aspect of a problem in isolation from other causes. A job-training
program, for example, will not work if there are no efforts to create
new jobs.8
Third, existing state and federal policies rest on assumptions
about poverty and the workforce that are no longer true. For example, the assumption that low-income people can easily find jobs
and work their way out of poverty is untrue.9 There have been
huge job losses nationwide over the past two decades. There simply are not enough jobs that pay decent wages; many people are in
poverty despite being employed. 10
The STEPS proposal concludes that children and adults afflicted
by poverty over a number of years are a lost resource to society
because they frequently suffer irreversible nutritional, health and
developmental damage. This human toll has very significant long6. STEPS, supra note 5, at 3.
7. See, e.g., JAN L. HAGEN & LIANE V. DAVIS, THE NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER
INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT, ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE ON WELFARE REFORM: CONVERSATIONS WITH MOTHERS ON WELFARE (1994).
8. STEPS, supra note 5, at 3.
9. Real wages of less skilled laborers have in fact steadily declined since the late
1970s. Rebecca M. Blank, Policy Watch Proposalsfor Time Limited Welfare, 8 J. OF
ECON. PERSPECTIVES (1994).
10. See Center for Law and Social Policy, Making Work Pay, 6 FAMILY MATTERS 7
(1994). Although labor markets have recently improved, job recovery remains uneven. Nationally, only 1/5 of the recession's factory job losses and 2/3 of construction
losses have been restored. N. J. DEP'T OF LABOR, N. J. ECONOMIC INDICATORS (Jan.

1995).
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term economic costs, requiring economic maintenance, services,
and in some cases, even more costly forms of social intervention,
such as institutionalization.
B.

Components of the Proposal

The STEPS proposal introduces a new type of welfare reform
that is far broader than the traditional cost-oriented reforms proposed by Congress. As the following discussion of the proposal's
components demonstrates, the proposal is specifically designed to
address the concerns discussed above.
1.

Set and maintain a realistic standard of need that accurately
assesses the amount necessary for a safe and decent life.

New Jersey currently bases its grant levels on an official "standard of need," that ostensibly reflects a percentage of actual living
costs (i.e., the amount of income necessary to enjoy a minimally
safe and decent life). The standard, however, is outdated by five
years: the most recent assessment occurred in 1990.11 As a result,
current grant levels, set at only 43% of the assessment figure, are
extremely low.' 2 To be meaningful, the standard must be updated
to reflect present cost-of-living data, and then kept current on an
annual basis. 13 The standard also needs other revisions. Most importantly, the standard must be increased to account for all major
essential living costs, including, but not limited to, housing, food,
clothing, child care, medical, dental and vision care, transportation,
taxes and important personal needs. Additionally, the standard
should make some provisions for extraordinary emergency expenses. Government policy should be directed to all those whose
incomes fall below this up-dated comprehensive standard.
11. The standard is set forth at N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 2-1.1A (1994). Grant
levels are set forth at tit. 10, § 2-1.2.
12. For example, the value of the maximum AFDC benefit for a three-person

household in New Jersey fell by 63% between 1970 and 1994. HOUSE COMMIrEE ON
WAYS AND MEANS,

103rd Cong., 2d Sess.,

OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS:
BOOK]. After

1994 GREEN BOOK 376 (Comm. Print 1994)[hereinafter 1994 GREEN

accounting for inflation, New Jersey's basic grant of $302 in 1970 would equal over
$1100 today; the current grant for a three-person household is $424. See id. at 377 n.3.
13. New Jersey is required by state law to articulate an accurate standard periodically. See In re Petitions for Rulemaking, N.J.A.C. 10:82-1.2 and 10:85-4.1, 566 A.2d
1154 (N.J. 1989).
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2. Allow people to work and be on or remain eligible for public
assistance until their household incomes reach the standard of
need, as long as they follow all required elements of an
individualizedplan (called a "service plan") designed to allow
them to be able to find and keep. work that pays a living
income.
At present, eligibility for public assistance in New Jersey is
capped at less than half of the standard of need.' 4 As a result, the
system contains a significant disincentive to work: those who work
and earn significantly more than the grant level are forced off welfare, even though their income may be well below the standard of
need.
The STEPS proposal urges New Jersey to move toward a "fill
the gap" approach, which would allow people to work and supplement all or most of what they earn with welfare benefits until their
household's total income reaches the standard of need. 15 The new
approach would use an inclusive and comprehensive definition of
"income from all sources" that includes: wages; welfare grants;
other forms of public assistance received (to the extent that the
amounts of those benefits have also been included in the calculation of the standard of need); child support; tax credits that result
in actual increases in household resources; and other applicable income. The new system would further redefine public assistance eligibility so that all households whose total income is below the
standard of need are eligible for public assistance.
The "fill the gap" approach is centered on an individualized service plan. This plan would state the responsibilities of both parties
to the public assistance contract. The recipient would be bound to
take reasonable steps to access programs, services, training and education designed to assist the transition from welfare to work. In
return, the government agency would be required, within budget
limits, to provide or coordinate referrals to such programs, services, training, and education. The service plan would have clear
time frames for performance that can be adjusted subsequently in
the light of new realities. These time frames could serve as more
realistic, individualized "time limits," but should be subject to extension whenever necessary.
14. In 1994, the maximum AFDC grant in New Jersey for a one-parent family of
three persons was $424. Combined with food stamps, that family's benefits would
total $700 for the month. At the same time the standard of need in New Jersey was
$985. 1994 GREEN BOOK, supra note 12, at 366.
15. STEPS, supra note 5, at 8.
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Provide income security at the standard of need for those
unable to work or to find work, and reform the grant
structure to include a housing component so that
everyone is able economically to remain in
stable housing.

For a variety of reasons, including disability, unavailability of
jobs and need for training or other services that government does
not have the funding for, many people currently in need of public
assistance are unable to earn their way out of poverty, and require
ongoing assistance if they are to avoid complete destitution. For
families with children, the STEPS proposal suggests that continuing assistance should be designed as a child support assurance program, under which the government insures that the difference
between child support payments and the standard of need will be
filled if the16 family's wage earners cannot or do not do so
themselves.
Current welfare grants do not provide special allowance or consideration given for housing costs. This structure, combined with
the inadequacy of the grants themselves, contributes to recurring
client homelessness. A family's or individual's housing situation
must be stable before there is a reasonable chance of securing economic stability. To insure housing stability, and to achieve greater
equity between welfare clients on a basic grant, who receive no
special housing allowance, and those who face imminent homelessness, who may be eligible for some additional emergency housing
assistance, the state must implement a housing component to the
standard grant. The housing component should be coordinated
with an ongoing state-based rental
assistance program analogous to
17
the federal Section 8 program.
The separate housing component of the STEPS proposal would
provide needy families with an amount necessary to secure shelter
in New Jersey, based on information generated in the updated
standard of need analysis.' 8 This separate component could be co16. STEPS, supra note 5, at 9.
17. Congress created the Section 8 Housing Program under the Housing Community Development Act of 1974. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437(0 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The

program provides low income and elderly tenants assistance in the private housing
market through five programs: existing housing, moderate rehabilitation, substantial
rehabilitation, new construction and voucher programs. Id. Through these programs,
tenants pay from 10% to 30% of their income towards their rent. The remaining
portion of the fair market rent, as determined by the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development, is supplemented by the federal government. Id.
18. STEPS, supra note 5, at 9-10.
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ordinated with-and welfare funds could help support-a stable,
ongoing housing assistance program, that would rely principally on
rental subsidies. Such a program would ease the present situation,
in which recipients face a chaotic cycle of eviction, homelessness,
and long-term "temporary" housing. Additionally, this component
would be fair to all public assistance recipients in that both homeless recipients and persons relying on a standard grant would receive enough to meet their housing costs. 19
4.

Continue state income tax reform so that people whose
earnings and other income below the standard of need
are not taxed.

As a matter of policy, it is illogical to tax those who make significantly less than the standard of need. By taxing persons living below the poverty level, the state reinforces the problem of poverty
and creates a greater need for public assistance. In recent years,
New Jersey has taken steps in the right direction by raising the
state minimum income tax threshold. The new threshold would be
even more effective, however, if it were combined with a State
Earned Income Tax Credit for persons whose total income remains
below the standard of need. Under the STEPS proposal, the tax
credit would be available to both family and individual wage earners. This would further support efforts to achieve economic stability through work.20
5.

Repeal the child exclusion provision and resist other arbitrary
limits or restrictions.

In 1992, New Jersey became the first state to adopt a Child Exclusion provision, under which children born to families that were
on welfare for ten months prior to the birth do not receive an additional grant; the total grant for such an eligible family unit remains
the same as it was prior to the birth.2 ' The Child Exclusion provision is an extreme example of a policy that harms and punishes
blameless children in an attempt to change the conduct of parents. 2 It should be repealed as a punitive measure on innocent
19. STEPS, supra note 5, at 10.
20. STEPS, supra note 5, at 10.
21. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:10-3.5 (West 1992).

22. As to the waiver process generally and its application to the child exclusion,
see Susan Bennett & Kathleen Sullivan, Disentitling the Poor: Waivers and Welfare
"Reform", 26 MIcH. J.L.

REFORM

741 (1993).
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persons.2 3 If the state wishes to influence the behavior of parents,
it should more carefully tailor its programs to protect children.
6

Provide adequate supportfor work so that those obstacles that
prevent people from finding work can be overcome
whenever possible.

The STEPS proposal argues that training, education, job placement and child care will improve the ability of some recipients to
find work.24 Because public dollars are scarce, states will always
face difficult decisions over how much funding to allocate to these
purposes, as opposed to providing basic income security or other
important anti-poverty programs. While it is impossible to state
how this balance should be struck, such support services can be
25
critical for many people trying to achieve economic stability.

The STEPS proposal stresses intensive, individualized case management that includes a careful assessment of each individual's
work readiness and other needs, followed by ongoing and meaningful case management to help address those needs.2 6 The proposed program would also provide participants with the
opportunity to obtain the education and training necessary to obtain work with wages that satisfy realistic sustenance needs. It
would further provide job search assistance and support services,
as well as meaningful publicly-funded jobs for those individuals
who are already employable but are unable to find work. The publicly-funded work envisioned by the STEPS program would provide the opportunity to build or preserve skills that would enable
an individual to secure a private sector or regular public sector job.
A final aspect of the plan would recognize that poor persons
with recently-found jobs continue to need support. Thus, the program would continue to provide essential services such as health
care, child care and housing assistance, during the critical period
after a family leaves welfare but before wages reach the established
standard of need. The continued assistance would insure that no
one is forced to choose between a job and quality child care, health
care, or housing.
The STEPS proposal concludes by acknowledging that the
broader changes listed above, are not exclusive. Many other re23. STEPS, supra note 5, at 10.
24. Id.

25. Id.
26. Id. at 11.
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forms in the administration of public assistance need to be
instituted. z7
In total, these proposals would significantly enhance the assist-

ance and supports available to impoverished welfare recipients.
Proponents of such fill-the-gap .approaches contend that average
welfare grant levels per recipient will decrease because the number

of recipients working and supplementing their incomes with earnings will increase. The amount saved from the decreased average
grant levels will offset the increased costs that will result from the
expansion of eligible clients under the proposal's more generous

assistance/eligibility standard. In addition, proponents suggest that
there will be long-term savings in governmental expenditures because investing more in children's welfare will avoid far greater ex-

penditures in later remedial and service costs. Nonetheless, in the
short run the STEPS proposal is highly likely to result in higher
government expenditures. As discussed below, this higher cost
would have significant consequences for the program's implemen-

tation if the proposed block grant legislation is passed. 8

27. The proposal's specific recommendations included the following:
a) Make all households eligible, without regard to whether they are one-parent or
two-parent headed units.
b) Make the start date for collecting benefits to be the date of application, as is
now the case in Food Stamps.
"c) Consider only income and resources that are actually and currently available in
determining eligibility for benefits. Do not consider "income" that is not actually
received or property that can't really be sold quickly.
d) Provide realistic deductions from income for child care costs and work expenses;
significantly raise the current limits on the amount of earnings which may be disregarded for child care costs and other Work expenses to reflect a fair estimate of the
costs.

e) Increase the limit on the amount of resources a family can own and still be
eligible from $1000 to at least $2000, as is now the case with Food Stamps.
f) Allow a family to own at least one vehicle without counting the value of the
vehicle as a resource. Otherwise, change the rule that counts any value above $1500 as
a resource to $4500, as is now the case with Food Stamps.
g) Do not seek to recover overpayments to a family if the overpayment happened
because of a technical error, or the family was not at fault and is still in need, as is now
the case in Social Security and SSI.
h) Allow AFDC families receiving a share or pass-through of current child support
collections, if paid when due, to also receive a share or pass-through of arrears
payments.
i) Treat a child's Social Security benefits like any other child support payments for
the purpose of the disregard of the first $50 of current child support payments received by a family in a month.
j) Disregard the first $50 of current child support payments received by a family in
a month in the Food Stamps program, as is now the case in AFDC.
STEPS, supra note 5, at 11-12.
28. See infra part IV.
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M.

Reform Under the Current Legal System
The present legal framework for the national public assistance
system is the Social Security Act, 29 especially the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. 30 The statutory sections and accompanying regulations 31 of AFDC impose a set of national requirements that state AFDC systems must meet in order
to receive federal money. In general, if a proposed state change in
its welfare system offends one of these requirements, the state is
required to show that it is an "experimental, pilot, or demonstration project" that will promote the objectives of the Social Security
Act, 32 and therefore should be granted a waiver of the violated federal requirements from the Secretary of the Department of Health
and Human Services.
The federal requirements have produced a high degree of uniformity among states in certain key areas of welfare plan design.
There are numerous regulatory requirements for state plans,33
including mandatory determination of need on "an objective and
equitable basis,' 34 and utilization of a statewide standard for determining need.35 Uniformity is also insured by statutory provisions
such as the requirement "that Aid to Families with Dependent
Children shall.., be furnished... to all eligible individuals .... "36
The granting of, or refusal to grant, waivers generated a number
of challenges in the courts over the years. As stated by the Third
Circuit, AFDC "is not a scheme of unlimited state discretion" because "Congress [has] defined an area of state prerogative, the
boundaries of which are defined by the congressional policies both
explicit and implicit." 37 The waiver process has also become an opportunity and forum for the formulation and execution of federal
welfare policy. The administration of President George Bush first
used the waiver vehicle as a pathway for states to propose sometimes dramatic new programs in welfare administration. This use
of waiver processes and encouragement of state experimentation
was carried on with new enthusiasm under President Bill Clinton.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).

30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
31. 45 C.F.R. §§ 201.0-201.70 (1994).

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
(1977).

42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a) (1994).
45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(1)(i) (1994).
45 C.F.R. § 233.20 (a)(2)(i) (1994).
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10)(A) (1988).
Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611, 615 (3d Cir. 1975) (en banc), rev'd 432 U.S. 438
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In testimony to Congress last fall, a leading Clinton Administration
welfare official underscored this encouragement of experimentation:
[T]he Administration is committed to granting states the flexibility to test innovations designed to help the state's AFDC program better meet the objectives of the Act. In general, states
submitting demonstration projects are attempting to put together packages that, taken as a whole, seek to promote all of
the objectives of the Acts not to elevate one objective over the
other.38
The same Administration official indicated the way in which Administration welfare policy can be effectuated through the waiver
process:
In reviewing these applications, we follow a number of basic
principles: avoiding harm to recipients within the demonstrations; rigorous evaluation; cost neutrality; and, encouraging the
testing of policies that are in line with the principles of the President's welfare reform proposal, the Work and Responsibility
Act, while remaining open to additional approaches.39
As of September 1994, the Administration approved eighteen
demonstration projects. Indeed, there was such a sharp increase in
waiver activity that on September 27, 1994, the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services proposed a new formal statement on
"Demonstration Proposals Pursuant to Section 1115(a) of the Social Security Act General Policies And Procedures."40
In addition to compliance with Social Security Act requirements
and the concomitant regulatory framework, other federal requirements are applicable to states seeking waivers. Perhaps most significantly, the Department of Health and Human Services must
review waiver applications in accordance with basic principles of
administrative law under the Administrative Procedure Act.41
While the law is not settled, it is likely that other statutory and
even constitutional provisions will apply to waiver review as well.
38. AFDC Waiver Demonstration Programs Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources and IntergovernmentalRelations of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (statement of Mary Jo Bane, Assistant Secretary for
Children and Families, Administration for Children and Families, U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services), available in Westlaw, USTESTIMONY Library, 1994
WL 527419, at 4.
39. Id. at 4-5.
40. 59 Fed. Reg. 49, 249-49, 251 (1994).
41. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988); see also 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1977 & Supp. 1995).
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In litigation recently decided in the District Court of New Jersey,42
plaintiffs raised claims of violations of Department of Health and
Human Services regulations governing experimentation involving
pregnant women and fetuses,4 3 as well as constitutional claims involving violations of both due process and equal protection. In this
instance, the claims were dismissed. 44
It is unlikely that any of the provisions of the STEPS Coalition
welfare reform proposal would be held to violate express provisions of the Social Security Act. The decidedly affirmative thrust
of the proposal goes well beyond, and appears fully consistent with,
the baseline requirements of the statute. The additional cost involved in the expanded eligibility and increased supportive services
entailed by the proposal would, however, likely run afoul of the
principle of "cost neutrality" currently applied by the Department
of Health and Human Services.45 The proposal does not appear to
pose any cognizable constitutional issues, nor does it appear to run
afoul of the regulation on the testing of human subjects because its
thrust is to expand rather than curtail benefits.
By contrast, a welfare waiver proposal that would place a strict
one-year time limit on receipt of welfare benefits, or that entailed
similar limits or restrictions, is virtually certain to meet a variety of
challenges, including violation of the basic purposes of the AFDC
program.46 In addition, it is certain to raise constitutional claims
with regard to the arbitrary cutoff of assistance.47 In general, as
long as reform proposals are recipient-centered and tend to expand
rights, and are applied in a consistent and uniform way on a statewide basis, they are likely to have little problem with waiver review
under the current statutory scheme. By contrast, proposals that
terminate or limit benefits, especially where they are applied in a
differential way, may be expected to pose substantial difficulties on
waiver review.
42. C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. 991 (D. N.J., 1995).
43. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101-.124 (1994).
44. C.K., 883 F. Supp. at 1015.

45. See statement of Mary Jo Bane, supra note 38, at 7. The principle of cost
neutrality is aimed at "ensuring responsible stewardship of federal funds while al-

lowing state flexibility." Id. The Department compares the costs of the state experiment to those of a control group to ensure that the costs of the experiment are not too
high. Id.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1988).
47. See, e.g., C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. 991 (D.N.J. 1995); Beno v. Shalala, 30
F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 1994).
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IV.

Prospects for Welfare Reform Within
a Block-Grant Setting

Current proposals in Congress call for an amalgam of certain aspects of the Personal Responsibility Act, with a new block-grant
approach for the AFDC program.48 Under the Personal Responsibility Act, passed by the House of Representatives on March 29,
1995, a single new cash welfare block grant would be created in
order to "provide assistance to needy families;"4 9 "promote
work
'51
and marriage; 50 and "discourage illegitimate births.
The new block grants would replace four current cash welfare
programs: AFDC,52 AFDC Administration, 53 the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) Program, 4 and the Emergency Assistance Program. 5 While formally presented as a measure designed
to create maximum flexibility for the states by freeing them from
federal restrictions, the proposed block grant would in fact impose
several new restrictive conditions on any cash assistance block
grant funding passed to the states.
States would be prohibited from using block grant funds to provide cash welfare to:
(1) Mothers under eighteen who have a child out of wedlock;56
(2) Families that have an additional child while on welfare;57
(3) Parents 58not working after two years of receiving cash
welfare;
(4) Families receiving cash welfare for more than five years;59
and
(5) Non-citizens60
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
serting
57.
serting
58.
serting
59.
serting
60.
serting

H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
H.R. 4 § 401.
Id.
Id.
42 U.S.C. §§ 601-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
42 U.S.C. § 602 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
42 U.S.C. § 681-87 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
42 U.S.C. § 681-687 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
H.R. 4 § 101 (striking part A of Title IV of
§ 405(a)(4)).
H.R. 4 § 101 (striking part A of Title IV of
§ 405(a)(5)).
H.R. 4 § 101 (striking part A of Title IV of
§ 402(a)(1)(B)).
H.R. 4 § 101 (striking part A of Title IV of
§ 405(a)(6)).
H.R. 4 § 101 (striking part A of Title IV of
§ 405(a)(3)).

the Social Security Act and inthe Social Security Act and inthe Social Security Act and inthe Social Security Act and inthe Social Security Act and in-
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With the exception of these new restrictions, the entire web of
statutory provisions and accompanying regulations contained in
the Social Security Act would be repealed. 6 ' The range of protections related to statewide consistency, objectivity, the promotion of
basic purposes of the Act and many others would be withdrawn.
This would constitute a dramatic reversal of the pattern of federal
funding for public assistance, converting it from a program that incorporates an array of protections for recipients in addition to
other strictures relating to program administration to a short list of
specific restrictions on recipients' participation and benefits. The
present waiver process for reviewing experimental or demonstration projects would be eliminated. Other than periodically providing requisite data on expenditures and performance to the federal
government, states would be free to design programs they wished
within the parameters of the short list of specific restrictions.
At first glance, block grants appear to confer substantially increased flexibility. Not only are the vast majority of federal standards removed, but the intensive discretionary involvement of
federal officials through the waiver process would also be
eliminated.
To test the actual affect such block grant proposals would have, it
is instructive to contrast the viability of the STEPS proposal with
the viability of the hypothetical one-year limit proposal under the
proposed congressional scheme. The recipient-focused STEPS
proposal would violate new House-passed all restrictions (e.g., limits on aid to mothers under eighteen 62 and the five year assistance
cap 63 ), and in its current form would thus not be allowable. The
STEPS proposal would have to be modified to incorporate the substantive restrictions, and even after such modifications, the higher
short-term cost of the STEPS proposal would likely make it prohibitively expensive under newly capped block grant allocations to
states. Total federal funding for the block grant is capped at the
level of federal spending for AFDC, JOBS, and Emergency Assistance for fiscal 1994. 64
61. H.R. 4 § 101 ("Title IV of the Social Security Act... is amended by striking
part A, except sections 403(h) and 417, and inserting the following ...
62. H.R. 4, § 405(4).
63. H.R. 4, § 405(6).
64. H.R. 4, § 101 (striking part A of Title IV of the Social Security Act and in-

serting § 403(a)(1)). The exact computation for the grant is described at the newly
inserted § 403(b)(1) and is based on generally the amount of AFDC funds that the
state claimed in 1994. The total amount of AFDC expenditures for all the states cannot exceed $15,390, 296,000. Id. (inserting § 403(b)(1)(C)).
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In contrast, the restrictive one-year proposal would likely pass
muster under the new block grant scheme. The one-year limitation
is actually more severe than current federal proposals, but it is similarly restrictive, and thus, a potential challenge on federal preemption grounds, because the proposal's one-year limit is more severe
65
than the five-year term in the federal legislation, would likely fail.
Thus, all the substantive requirements of the new legislation, as
well as the underlying fiscal pressures, militate toward reduction or
curtailment of benefits, services, and recipient population, rather
than their expansion. While it is certainly possible that some states
will initially seek to continue existing benefit and service levels
now offered to AFDC recipients, inevitably, many states, encouraged by the restrictive substance of the federal legislation, will
choose to cut back their programs. As a consequence, states with
relatively more generous benefit, service or eligibility provisions
are likely to find themselves in demand, perhaps under siege, as
other states pursue reduction strategies. Higher benefit states
would have a limited number of options available to them in seeking to protect their fiscal situations. One solution for such states
would be to try to reach agreements with neighboring states, seeking some common ground in benefits. Such compacts, if achieved,
would likely find compromise well toward the lower end of the
scale, because states already providing low benefits would have little incentive to raise them dramatically.
A second option would be the passage of legislation restricting
the ability of people to move in from other states and' immediately
take advantage of higher benefit levels. Such anti-mobility
schemes are of doubtful constitutionality.66 As a result, states are
not likely to be able to rely on such anti-mobility laws for protection, adding further impetus to a severe downward pressure, and
very definite anti-expansive pressure in welfare benefits, eligibility,
and services.
In sum, whether intentionally or not the new federal block-grant
proposal, if enacted, will encumber its grant of greater flexibility to
states and will add pressure and incentives for greater restrictions

65. See H.R. 4, § 403(c).
66. See Shapiro v. Thompson; 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Green v. Anderson, 811 F.
Supp. 516 (E.D. Cal. 1993), aff'd 26 F.3d 95 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated as moot, 115 S.

Ct. 1059 (1995); Jonathan Romberg, Is There a Doctrine in the House?: Welfare Reform and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 22
(1995).
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on eligibility, benefits, and services. Such likely consequences,
however, have not been a focus of the legislative debate to date.
IV. Conclusion
As the STEPS proposal asserts, much of current welfare reform
policy is driven by inaccurate assumptions regarding the labor market and on inaccurate assessments of the level of income that will
enable persons to enjoy a minimally decent life. These information
gaps must be filled so that the public discourse at the state and
local level will be more meaningful and effective.
The STEPS proposal acknowledges the realities of poverty. It is
better equipped to actually help people move out of poverty. It
would, however, violate the mandates of the Personal Responsibility Act and thus, is not likely to be implemented in the current
legislative climate. Meaningful welfare reform requires further discussion of the issues raised by the doubtful viability of the STEPS
proposal under the proposed block grants legislation.

